We examine incentives to seize and defend goods offered for trade in an Edgeworth box economy. Appropriation possibilities generate an equilibrium of coerced redistribution and voluntary trade in a reduced box. Potential mutual gains remain untaken because the prospect of piracy creates a price wedge, wherein the effective relative price is lowered for the exporter and raised for the importer. As the vulnerability of one or both goods increases, the price wedge widens, causing trade to diminish. If vulnerability becomes sufficiently high, then trade and appropriation are driven to zero, or one or both players are rendered indifferent to trade. JEL Classification Codes: C72, D51, D74, F10
I. INTRODUCTION
Central to the field of conflict economics is the premise that appropriation stands coequal with production and trade as a fundamental category of economic activity. In the words of Hirshleifer's (1994, 2) Resource allocations to appropriation and defense fundamentally affect the acquisition and retention of wealth. Moreover, production, trade, and relative prices are reshaped by appropriation in ways that are generally ignored in mainstream economics.
Appropriation possibilities are part of the everyday human condition. This is most obvious in less developed economies experiencing tyranny, corruption, criminal syndicates, or civil war.
In such settings insecure property rights create strong incentives for appropriation and defense.
For example, traders who bring their goods to market must allocate resources to protect their goods along the way. If trade is sufficiently vulnerable to appropriation, would-be traders may find that autarky is the better option. More generally, appropriative struggles in insecure economies redistribute wealth, reduce consumption, diminish investment, and dampen specialized production and trade, as documented in Collier et al. (2003) . Even in economies with ostensibly secure property rights, appropriation possibilities pervade economic life. Electronic and video security systems; piracy of music, software, and motion pictures; and common theft are but a few examples of appropriation possibilities at work in modern economies. Even a commonplace vending machine is, upon closer look, a sophisticated piece of defense capital designed to induce exchange rather than appropriation.
Economists have begun to incorporate Hirshleifer's dark side of behavior into mainstream general equilibrium models of economic activity. The common theme linking these models is that appropriation activity is costly in terms of forgone production and/or exchange. Also common is the use of contest success functions whereby appropriative outcomes are determined by competing resources and conflict technology. The models differ primarily with respect to which categories of economic activity are considered. In this regard, conflict models fall into three groups. Perhaps best known are models that combine production and appropriation; other models include exchange and appropriation; and a few models allow all three activities. 1 We present a model of vulnerable trade which, as the name suggests, focuses on the interaction of exchange and appropriation and hence falls in the second group of conflict models above. Our starting point is a standard Edgeworth box, notable for its relative simplicity and widespread recognition among economists. We introduce appropriation opportunities by assuming that while endowments are secure, goods are vulnerable to appropriation once offered for trade. Beginning from a situation of secure trade, we ask what are the economic effects of increased vulnerability of one or both goods. Our model is differentiated from most others in that we assume traded goods rather than endowments are subject to appropriation; we permit the degree of vulnerability to differ between goods; and we show that vulnerability can generate autarky as an equilibrium outcome. 
In equation (1) Equating expenditures to disposable income and dividing through by
Y P yields
A's budget constraint, where
denotes the world relative price of X:
Solving (3) for X A leads to:
Assuming Cournot/Nash behavior, A's maximization problem is:
is defined by (4).
The first-order conditions for an interior solution to (5) are:
Equations (6)- (8) From the above we obtain six first-order conditions and two budget constraints that together define the optimal consumption levels and resource allocations for players A and B. We close the system with a price equation whereby the value of A's realized exports equals the same for B:
The nine equations are assumed to define a Nash equilibrium in Pr units of Y, just equal to B's subjective value of X in consumption. In summary, the divergent effective prices discount for anticipated piracy and thereby restrain trade.
Figure 1 also demonstrates the utility losses associated with the resource cost and wedge effects of appropriation possibilities. Focusing on player A, the decline in utility from U 2 to U 1 is due to the resource cost effect. The additional decline in utility, from U 1 to U 0 , is associated with the wedge effect. Given symmetry, the same utility losses hold for player B.
Lastly, note that Figure 1 implies that each player prefers vulnerable trade to autarky. Player
A's indifference curve through point d is higher than A's indifference curve through point a.
Hence, player A (and by symmetry, player B) prefers vulnerable trade to autarky (U 0 > U a ).
However, if appropriation possibilities are sufficiently strong, the resource cost and wedge effects could result in indifference curve U 0 lying below the indifference curve through point a.
In this case autarky would be the equilibrium prediction of the vulnerable trade model.
III. EXAMPLES OF VULNERABLE TRADE Additional Assumptions
As noted in the introduction, our primary focus is on the economic effects of increased vulnerability of one or both goods. To explore the comparative statics, we begin by operationalizing the symmetry assumptions of the illustration above. Specifically, we assume that players A and B have an identical constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function Throughout the examples we assume ratio-form contest success functions:
. If no resources are allocated to defense or attack of a traded good, then its retention ratio is defined as unity, and there is no appropriation. To explore the effects of vulnerability further, we calculated additional solutions using the same parameters as in Figures 2 and 3 but with alternative vulnerability levels. The details are reported in Table 1 . Three observations are in order. First, the relationship between vulnerability and the wedge effect is evident across the full range of vulnerabilities in the table.
As vulnerability increases, the wedge between effective prices widens and trade flows diminish.
Second, the relationships between vulnerability on the one hand and resource costs and appropriation levels on the other are nonmonotonic. When vulnerability increases from very low levels, fortification, attack, and appropriation initially increase as might be expected. Player A suffers not only reduced trade due to the wedge effect but also increased piracy from player B.
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In Table 2 
IV. VULNERABLE TRADE AND AUTARKY
We employ again the assumption of complete symmetry to explore two related questions:
What determines the level of vulnerability that cuts off trade, and what characterizes the emergence of autarky as an equilibrium? We begin with tentative answers to the two questions and then follow with evidence from numerical solutions.
The level of vulnerability at which trade is extinguished depends on the mutual gains that would be available if trade were secure. The greater the potential gains in the classic Edgeworth box economy, the more robust is trade with respect to increases in vulnerability. The potential gains in turn depend on the initial endowment point and the curvature of the indifference curves.
The farther the endowment point from the contract curve and the more convex the indifference curves, the greater is the vulnerability level that cuts off trade.
Turning to the second question, increased vulnerability can generate autarky in two distinct ways, as discovered in the preceding section. The trade equilibrium can leave one or both players at a utility level equal to that under autarky, so that they are willing to forgo trade. Any gains to realized trade are offset by resource costs and appropriation losses. In terms of our Edgeworth box figures with complete symmetry, the final consumption point d falls at the intersection of respective indifference curves corresponding to the initial-endowment utilities. This is autarky by indifference. Alternatively, the wedge effect can drive exports and likewise defense, attack, and appropriation to zero. In terms of the figures, the final consumption point d converges to the initial endowment point a. This is autarky by convergence.
Seeking support for these answers, we ran a series of computations for alternative CES utility for which players' utilities at the trade equilibrium just equaled their utilities under autarky. We present the results in Figure 6 . For each elasticity of substitution, we plot a locus of points above which combinations of vulnerability and relative endowment disparity generate trade and below which they yield autarky. 8 To anticipate, the results confirm the answers above, but they also hold several surprises. Figure 6 shows that the level of vulnerability at which trade is extinguished is systematically related to relative endowment disparity and elasticity of substitution. Holding relative endowments fixed, the smaller the elasticity of substitution, and hence the more convex the indifference curves, the larger is the critical level of vulnerability. As a result, trade is more robust to vulnerability when substitutability between goods is low. As mentioned above, Figure 6 presents some surprises, foremost of which is the nonmonotonic pattern of the trade-autarky loci. The implication is that holding endowment disparity and substitutability constant, increases in vulnerability can shift an economy from trade to autarky, back to trade, and then again to autarky. For example, consider in Figure emerges again up to convergence point w, and is extinguished for all points beyond. The numerical details for these shifts between trade and autarky are presented in Table 3 .
The movements between trade and autarky can be understood in terms of the principles discovered in the preceding sections. Recall that trade vulnerability generates both a resource cost effect and a wedge effect on players' utilities. The first effect refers to the diversion of resources for defense and attack, while the second refers to the spread between effective export and import prices due to piracy. Also recall that the resource cost effect is nonmonotonic.
Resource costs first increase with vulnerability but then diminish as defense and attack levels converge to zero. The wedge effect, on the other hand, increases relentlessly. Together this means that as vulnerability increases beyond comparatively low levels, a tradeoff arises between trade promotion due to reduced allocations to defense and attack and trade hindrance due to a widened price wedge.
Now apply these principles to the increases in vulnerability along the dashed line of Figure 6 .
As the economy approaches point u, the resource cost effect diminishes, thus increasing the amount of goods available for gross exports. The increasing wedge effect dominates, however, reducing the potential gains available from gross exports. At point u players become indifferent to trade, and with further increases in vulnerability they opt out of trade. None of this is too remarkable. The surprise comes in the movement from point u to a second indifference point v.
Somewhere along this path the resource cost effect diminishes at a rate sufficient to offset the increasing wedge effect. Prospective utilities increase until players become indifferent to trade at point v and then opt back into trade with further movement to the right. Eventually the resource cost effect diminishes at a diminishing rate, as defense and attack levels are reduced toward zero.
The still increasing wedge effect reasserts its dominance until trade converges to autarky at point w. Beyond this point, A's effective price of X becomes too high and B's too low to permit advantageous trade, and autarky rules.
V. CONCLUSION
Only in recent decades has appropriation begun to be treated as a basic form of economic activity. Perhaps the artificial separation of exchange and appropriation traces back to Adam
Smith. As Smith (1976 [1776] , 17) so famously observed, "the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange … is common to all men, and to be found in no other race of animals …. Nobody ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange … with another dog." Following Smith, the economics discipline has emphasized something that distinguishes humans from other animals: As the vulnerability of one or both goods increases, the price wedge widens, causing trade to diminish. The effects on resource costs and appropriation levels are nonmonotonic, however.
While investments in conflict initially increase, the reduction in goods offered for trade decreases appropriation opportunities. This in turn eventually causes resource costs and appropriation levels to diminish. If vulnerability becomes sufficiently high, then trade and appropriation are driven to zero, or one or both players are rendered indifferent to trade. In either way, autarky arises as the equilibrium outcome. Whereas traditional economics assumes that exchange generates gains relative to autarky, with appropriation possibilities autarky can be preferred to exchange. Even when exchange emerges over autarky, appropriation possibilities complicate exchange in ways that are generally ignored in economic theory. 1. For models of production and appropriation, see Brito and Intriligator (1985) , Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000) , Grossman and Kim (1995) , Hirshleifer (1995) , Neary (1997) , Skaperdas (1992) , and Usher ( 3. Once appropriated, goods are not traded; once traded, they are not appropriated.
4. On contest success functions, see Hirshleifer (1989 Hirshleifer ( , 2000 and Skaperdas (1996) . Our particular contest success function is identical to that of Grossman and Kim (1995) .
5. Numerical solutions were computed with Maple 8.00 and are available from the authors upon request. In cases of complete symmetry, selected computations were checked against the analytical solution in the Appendix.
6. An interesting feature discovered in this and subsequent numerical examples is that one player's optimal fortification equals the other player's appropriation of the same good. For A's fortification of good Y, the result is easily proven from A's first-order condition (7) (7) can be written as The symmetry information and equations (4) To find g, we substitute (A.12) into (A.9) and rearrange to obtain a single h term on the right: We then plug the reduced-form solution for h into (A.14), which yields equation (A.2).
To obtain Y A , we substitute the solution for h into (A.12), which gives equation ( 
